“Considerations of Considerations of Logic” [Photo 3214]

[Dr. Futon’s desk has recently been refurbished. Under the first three skins of lacquer, Dr. Futon inscribed an essay on the metaphysics of anti-logicians. The content is being translated into English currently. Please be patient as we endeavor to translate the text as accurately as we can. Thank you.]



“The Irrational-Rational Dialectic: Derrida”

exhibit A.

[Note: The untimely death of Jonathan Cullings is an unfortunate reminder of the brevity of human existence, a theme all too often reflected upon by Dr. Futon.1 We wish to send the Cullings estate our warmest condolences. Mr. Cullings’ work will remain among the finest in the history of photographical transcriptionism, a field virtually unheard of until his work with Sir Francis Elliot M.Radcliffe (as is well known!). To our readers, we covet your goodwill and patience as we endeavor to find a transcriptionist with even a fraction of Mr. Cullings’ skill.

Most appropriately,

Msr. C.F. Tremonte]

[E.N: The following article was rescued from a collection of Herald Times newspapers Dr. Futon had apparently intended to use for his daily bonfire-side meetings with other such notable theologians and philosophers as MH, DD, ML, and SLW. It is a small reflection on the nature of deconstructive criticism of literature, espoused by Mr. Derrida.]

The Irrational-Rational Dialectic: Derrida

Given Derrida’s hairsplitting logical criticisms of philosophical models native to “Western Civilization,” it is rather ironic that his deconstructive procedure aims to show logical incoherence in all texts. On could say that Deconstruction is a “procedure” that concerns itself, so to speak, with logically proving that all texts, at their core, are the arborescent offspring of illogical concepts. Yet, on what basis does the project of deconstruction proceed if not that of logic?

Assume, for instance, that a given author W composes a text seeking to overtly valorize a given concept x. The deconstructionist then comes along, poking at the text in search of some contradiction. He “finds” it. Then he proceeds to show that concept x is not what author W thinks it is; additionally, he asserts that x cannot do what author W wants it to do. Following this is an explanation as to why this is the case: “The text simultaneously asserts x and y by presupposing the necessity of y in order for x to arise as its binary rival.”What catches the observant reader’s attention, then, is not the “deconstruction” of the binary opposition, but the postulation of a new, higher order binary opposition. One may say there is an Hegelian synthesis of sorts at work here (cf. Glas), but this is not entirely the case. For in this consumptive dialectic, it is not the binarily opposed concepts that change, but the interpretation of their relationship to one another. The consumptive dialectic, as I shall hereafter refer to it in this article, proceeds as follows:


Consumptive Resolution 1:

text { x (explicit concept/s)

        +y (implicit concept/s)

Binaries are not original

to text and reality.}

Consumptive Resolution 2:

text { x (explicit concept/s)

        +y (implicit concept/s)

Binaries are original

to text and reality.

Deconstruction posits a different interpretation of the relation of binaries to one another in text and reality. It does not, however, truly resolve them in any way that is destructive of their existence as binaries. Rather, deconstructionism perpetuates binary oppositionalism. It consider a binary opposition’s function and ontology, but it cannot remove the opposition. Binaries exist; they are real and, even given the deconstructionist’s project, necessary. At the root of all this, ironically, is deconstruction’s exploitation of the law of identity and its inferable correlate, the law of non-contradiction.


1See, for instance, fragments P65 and Q11.

The Counsel of the Wicked Vs. The Law of the Lord (Pt. 1)

[Beneath Futon’s desk, adjacent to a burnt collection of photographs of Holland, a scattering of napkins were found with the following notes scribbled on them. I have enumerated them according to the themes shared among them.]

[1.]…hence, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. One wonders, however, where he[1] obtained the idea. Was it from Plato? No. He was no Platonist. He was a Plotinian philosopher. That hideous mustache of his could not hide the lips beneath that one can virtually hear singing from the pages of his writing: In order to go beyond good and evil, I must presuppose the inherent goodness of such a transgression against the ethics of the slaves! I believe, I truly believe, in a Good even more substantial than Plato’s – I simply don’t name it Goodness. I call it “POWER.”[2]

Psalm 14:1.[3]

[2.] That the Word was in the beginning with God is no small thing.[4] For it is this Word that is the Yay and Amen of the Father, meaning this, namely: There was a never a time in which anything was not under His Sovereignty, for as the Word of God, He is the expression of God, the exact Image of God who, within Himself, is the storehouse of all wisdom and knowledge. This is no Neoplatonism, however, for the Son is not the Father, but His Word. He is distinct from the Father and the Spirit and yet One with them as God. We are Christians, not Neoplatonists. If we were Neoplatonists then predication would be an impossibility. But, last I checked, there are still words and voices and bodily movements in the world. Now, we may utilize opposing hermeneutical principles, but we, nonetheless, do interpret all things. Why? Because we presuppose that all of what a thing is is definable in itself. The anti-essentialists make the claim that things are without essence. But is this not something that only an essentialist would say? Language demands that things be defined, but our finitude disallows our fully grasping what things truly are. We are like Adam, to whom God brought the animals to see what he would name them.[5]

Yet, herein lies that most fundamental of differences between ourselves and our progenitor:

He was IN the Garden; we have been kicked out.[6]

[3.]”In all this,” the writer says, “Job sinned not, nor charged God foolishly.”[7]And what many fail to learn from the book of Job is that God is the author of all events, and He discloses His operations to us as He sees fit. This means, of course, that the nature of God’s thought and that of man’s is qualitatively different. Job knew not the hearts of his children, nor the workings of God, nor the accusations of Satan. God, contrarily, knew all that was occurring, seeing as He ordered the events to occur. This is to say: the Lord’s knowledge is not obtained, but possessed eternally.

[4.]…and what is the mythological but natura partum in statua vir[8]? They go beyond the senses in establishing their nonsensical theories, and speak of a beyond which is explicable in our present language. They decry our use of analogical language to speak of the Lord, yet they utilize such language every time they speak of what caused the universe to be – a statement which presupposes:

i. an ontologically prior “what”

ii. time


iii. space

[1] F.W. Nietzsche

[2] Futon is criticizing Nietzsche here on quite a few accounts. In the first place, Futon argues that Nietzsche’s gradation of beings (from the nobility, which rests at the top of the social ontos, to the slaves, which rest at the bottom of the social ontos), and their corresponding morals or values are not a movement beyond Platonism, but the logical outgrowth of Plotinus’ Neoplatonic philosophy. In the second place, Futon emphasizes that, contrary to the conclusions of our postmodern revisionists (e.g. Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze, etc), Nietzsche’s socialized hierarchy of beings are emanations of the one “Good” which Nietzsche re-names “Power.” And, finally, in the third place, Futon emphasizes that Nietzsche’s own attempt to move beyond good and evil presupposes the Goodness of rebellion against slave morality and, hence, presupposes that all being and action are derivative of the One, which Nietzsche calls Power.

[3] “The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God. They are corrupt, they have done abominable works, there is none that doeth good.” (Holy Bible, King James Version)

[4] The allusion is to John 1:1, which reads: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.”

[5] Genesis 2:19: “And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof.” (KJV)

[6] Futon is here underscoring the Calvinist teaching on “Total Depravity.” According to Calvinists, the fall’s effects were not only spiritual (i.e. covenantal) and physical, but also noetic.

[7] Job 1:22 (KJV)

[8] “Nature made in the image of man.” One of Futon’s main influences, Severinus of Noricum, writes in his “Seven Treatises Concerning the Absurdities of Trophius the Atheist,”:

Thou knowest Him, and thou knowest that thou knowest. For hadst thou known not, thou would’st not have spoken thus, saying:

“The highest heaven of heavens is geometrically identifiable.”

For, no matter what extension thou givest it – Aerion granteth it flatness, as the smooth surface of a stone; Relias calleth it a rectangular plane; and still others speak of it as a circle, or spiral, or any other form – geometricity presupposeth space. And thou claimest to speak on behalf of that which was prior to space itself. Yay, even the mother of all inhabitability! Thou art a fool, Trophius, and knowest it not!

Thou should’st state openly what thy credo is –

natura partum in statua vir”

For thou art no wiser than thy pagan, Greek elder brothers. In concretizing that which existed before existence itself, thou speakest not only in absurdities, but in the language of the pagan mythologists.


{Treatise 3, Can. 24, Sec. 8}


[To D. Rison]

There are two things that are most disturbing to me about Nietzsche’s writings:

(i.)that the man was deluded enough to believe so strongly in, and so viciously attack, his own strawman


(ii.)that so many Christians were unable to tell the difference between their faith and Nietzsche’s misrepresentation of it…