“Considerations of Considerations of Logic” [Photo 3214]

[Dr. Futon’s desk has recently been refurbished. Under the first three skins of lacquer, Dr. Futon inscribed an essay on the metaphysics of anti-logicians. The content is being translated into English currently. Please be patient as we endeavor to translate the text as accurately as we can. Thank you.]



“The Irrational-Rational Dialectic: Derrida”

exhibit A.

[Note: The untimely death of Jonathan Cullings is an unfortunate reminder of the brevity of human existence, a theme all too often reflected upon by Dr. Futon.1 We wish to send the Cullings estate our warmest condolences. Mr. Cullings’ work will remain among the finest in the history of photographical transcriptionism, a field virtually unheard of until his work with Sir Francis Elliot M.Radcliffe (as is well known!). To our readers, we covet your goodwill and patience as we endeavor to find a transcriptionist with even a fraction of Mr. Cullings’ skill.

Most appropriately,

Msr. C.F. Tremonte]

[E.N: The following article was rescued from a collection of Herald Times newspapers Dr. Futon had apparently intended to use for his daily bonfire-side meetings with other such notable theologians and philosophers as MH, DD, ML, and SLW. It is a small reflection on the nature of deconstructive criticism of literature, espoused by Mr. Derrida.]

The Irrational-Rational Dialectic: Derrida

Given Derrida’s hairsplitting logical criticisms of philosophical models native to “Western Civilization,” it is rather ironic that his deconstructive procedure aims to show logical incoherence in all texts. On could say that Deconstruction is a “procedure” that concerns itself, so to speak, with logically proving that all texts, at their core, are the arborescent offspring of illogical concepts. Yet, on what basis does the project of deconstruction proceed if not that of logic?

Assume, for instance, that a given author W composes a text seeking to overtly valorize a given concept x. The deconstructionist then comes along, poking at the text in search of some contradiction. He “finds” it. Then he proceeds to show that concept x is not what author W thinks it is; additionally, he asserts that x cannot do what author W wants it to do. Following this is an explanation as to why this is the case: “The text simultaneously asserts x and y by presupposing the necessity of y in order for x to arise as its binary rival.”What catches the observant reader’s attention, then, is not the “deconstruction” of the binary opposition, but the postulation of a new, higher order binary opposition. One may say there is an Hegelian synthesis of sorts at work here (cf. Glas), but this is not entirely the case. For in this consumptive dialectic, it is not the binarily opposed concepts that change, but the interpretation of their relationship to one another. The consumptive dialectic, as I shall hereafter refer to it in this article, proceeds as follows:


Consumptive Resolution 1:

text { x (explicit concept/s)

        +y (implicit concept/s)

Binaries are not original

to text and reality.}

Consumptive Resolution 2:

text { x (explicit concept/s)

        +y (implicit concept/s)

Binaries are original

to text and reality.

Deconstruction posits a different interpretation of the relation of binaries to one another in text and reality. It does not, however, truly resolve them in any way that is destructive of their existence as binaries. Rather, deconstructionism perpetuates binary oppositionalism. It consider a binary opposition’s function and ontology, but it cannot remove the opposition. Binaries exist; they are real and, even given the deconstructionist’s project, necessary. At the root of all this, ironically, is deconstruction’s exploitation of the law of identity and its inferable correlate, the law of non-contradiction.


1See, for instance, fragments P65 and Q11.

The Irrationalities and Perplexities of Scientific Discourse

Identity Theft[The excerpt posted herein, the reader should note, has been faithfully recopied from Dr. Robert R. Robertson’s private collection (“Morts et Leurs Lettres Mortes”). A PDF version is available upon request.]

To whom it May Concern:

Anti-Science, Etc

The charge of anti-scientism is a badge I wear proudly, although I once thought that it was somehow a shameful thing to be opposed to that irrational beast. In what follows, I will give a handful of reasons as to why I stand opposed to the idea that science discovers truth, and more importantly the idea that science is a reliable means of understanding the world.

1. The Problem of Analogical Language

Within the context of a supposedly purely materialist discourse, that is to say within scientific discourse, there are two inescapable structuring elements, viz time and space. Without these three presupposed elements of structuration there are neither objects nor events to be observed, cataloged, experimented upon, etc. This is a problem for scientific discourse, for the search for the origin of the universe presupposes (a.)time, (b.)space, and (c.)matter, which are themselves assumed to be the structuring elements of all scientific discourse. The origin of the universe, or the origin of time, etc are events in time. In other words, there can never be an explanation of the origin of the universe, time, matter, for any explanation would presuppose the existence of what amounts to a “bare bones” universe consisting of space and time and matter. Thus, any theory that attempts to explain the origin of space, time, matter is reduced to speaking in absurdities. If the universe came to be, then it happened all at once or it progressively unfolded. In either case, it would have to have (a.)space in which the event takes place, (b.)time, and (c.)some basic and – assumed to be – necessary material entity to undergo change. Thus, there is no way for the materialist to ever cogently explain the origin of time, space, matter. There can be no cogent scientific theory explaining the origin of the universe, time, etc.

2. The Problem of Other Minds

Assuming that (1.) doesn’t dismantle vain attempts to give a materialistic explanation of the origins of space, time, and matter, we run into another problem. This is, in brief, the problem of other minds. Scientific discourse presupposes the following fundamental factors that cannot be proven via scientific inquiry: (i.)that minds are generally alike in their functioning, (ii.)that there are other minds that exhibit a general similarity among themselves, and (iii.)that other minds, if they exist and are generally alike, will not lie individually or collectively in order to achieve some benign, beneficial, or harmful end. There is no way to scientifically determine any of the above. Thus, scientific discourse begins with, proceeds on the basis of, and is held together by personal testimony accepted on good faith. Note that the personal testimony that is accepted is that of those in the scientific community regarding the reality of the existence of minds that are generally alike, the general similarity of minds among themselves, and the honesty of other minds; hence, an appeal to experimentation does not help, for experimentation presupposes (i.), (ii.), and (iii.). To appeal to experimentation, in other words, is to appeal to the testimony of other minds, and such testimony can only be accepted on the basis of good faith.

3. The Problem of Observation

The problem of induction lies at the root of this problem, which is disturbingly simple. In a nutshell, the problem is with observation itself. All observation is limited. Thus, it is not possible to identify relevant and irrelevant factors in a given phenomenon under consideration; and if this is not possible, then no amount of observation will ever provide the observer with what he needs in order to validate or invalidate his musings. What observational criteria exist? Who is it that has established such criteria? If it is an individual who has established these criteria, then the criteria are limited to his observational capacities (by which I mean his native biological capacities, as well as his technological, both human and mechanical, capacities). In any event, the criteria are, necessarily, laid down arbitrarily. And if they are arbitrary criteria, there is no way to know if they are the correct criteria for observation. And if this is so, then scientific findings based upon observation carried out according to these arbitrarily established observational criteria are false.

4. The Problem of Identity (Pt.1)

Strictly speaking, no two entities are identical. If A and A’ are identical in every other way, they nonetheless differ with regard to their being two numerically distinct entities. And numerically distinct entities, strictly speaking, do not occupy the same location. Consequently, given that the location of entities in space entails a finite number of relationships between them, numerically distinct entities will also differ qualitatively with respect to the relationship they bear to one another. This is problematic for scientific discourse because this further demonstrates that there are no repeatable events, for there are no repeatable entities, nor are there repeatable relationships between entities.

5. The Problem of Identity (Pt.2)

The assertion that “A” is anything, therefore, is irrational. Likewise, however, the assertion that A is not x, y, or z is also irrational, for it presupposes that while A is without an essential, definitional identity, x y, and z have an essential, definitional identity which is not predicable of A. Negative propositions (e.g., A is not A) are supervenient upon positive propositions (e.g., A is A). Consequently, the illusion of a “humble” exploration of a given phenomenon rests upon a constellatory network of positive propositions (i.e., identity assertions) without which neither positive nor negative predication relating to the phenomenon in question would be possible. The Law of Identity, in other words, undergirds and makes possible even the most radical aspirations to skepticism.

The problem, is simple: Either scientific discourse can justify its identity claims (with respect to either its phenomenal subject or its subject’s attendant predicates) and thereby justify its consequent inductions, or it cannot do so and, for this reason, cannot speak with authority about its phenomenal subject nor its subject’s attendant predicates. It cannot justify its identity claims at all. Therefore, it cannot justify its claims to knowledge.

On the False Notion of Humanity’s Psycho-Social Evolution

This is not Foucault's Head.

Knowing that the postmodern turn in academia is just another phase in fallen man’s rebellion against God, it is no wonder that we have steered clear of quickly admitting that postmodernists are right in some of their claims about man’s experience of reality as fragmentary, incoherent, paradoxical, etc. This is not unfortunate, but necessary. And yet, it also seems to be necessary to turn to these authors in the hopes of hearing not something new or something that will “teach” us what Scripture cannot teach us, but in the hopes of hearing echoes of what the Scriptures teach us about fallen mankind. Are the ideas of the Greeks internally inconsistent? Yes. Do they fall apart under the weight of their own contradictoriness when they are scrutinized? Yes. Are they expressions of a seemingly ateleological “power” which constructs these ideas as vehicles for its own further expression and self-propagation? Yes.

Why then are these things so? Are they “natural”? Are they unnatural? Are they the way things are in-themselves? Or are we to ignore the appearance/reality distinction implicit to all postmodern discourse? One may seek to avoid this distinction but it is impossible to do so, for the deconstruction of a text is an implicit recognition of a facade, a veneer, an appearance that must be probed beyond in order for the subject to obtain a knowledge of the thing-in-itself. Likewise with genealogical historiography, rhizomatic epistemology, and baudrillardrian hyppereality. This is, we should note, perhaps the most enjoyable feature of postmodern literature, a feature which it has in common with Nietzsche’s mad ramblings, viz. Watching its proponents clumsily perform a turn-of-the-tables, the ole- switcheroo, in identifying the accidental as substantial and the substantial as accidental. In this view, material and intellectual flux are identified as substantial, whereas fixity is contingent upon the substance called “material and intellectual flux” or “the infinite freeplay of signifiers”or….fill in the blanks with whatever postmodern gobbledygook you can recall, deconstruct, or construct.

Could it be more obvious than Deleuze’s identification of the virtual as the actual and the actual as the virtual?

One hardly thinks so.

“After All, What Does It Matter?” [An Excerpt]

[Dr. Futon’s frequent correspondences with D. Rison are at times definitive of the entirety of his onto-epistemological pursuits. The following pericope is illustrative of this fact. Found in one of Futon’s critical commentaries on the functional history of the Pseudo-Isadorean decretals.]

“….After all, what does it matter? A man, with no claim to any identity, lays claim to an identity and you would identify that as lying, whereas you identify these men as doing good work for the papal kingdom. Is a collective lie better than an individual lie? Play the fool, if you so wish, Mr. Rison, but what is evident is that the individual’s lie cannot be accounted for in your collectivist epistemology. An individual, as a part of the whole, cannot be identified as a transgressor, for he is part and parcel of that law. Be honest, Mr. Rison, and state what it is that concerns you: You are a pantheist, not a Christian, nor an atheist. You claim Christ is your Lord, but Thomas declares Him to be my Lord and my God. You deny the subject exists, which is bad enough logic in and of itself, but you go on to assert that an individual can transgress the law. You, sir, are a joke…”


Sketches of Subjectivity: A Pre-Christian Onto-epistemology

After the fire of ’23, Futon re-discovered some of his pre-Christian considerations of onto-epistemology. This document is one of several which were meant to form Futon’s dissertation. Due to his abrupt conversion to Christianity, however, Futon decided that his former cogitations were “refusing to submit to the Lordship of Christ, as is evidenced in the manifest unconscious-conscious dialectic of latent animosity toward the Divine” (Editorial 14, Parvum, Litterarum 13.5 (1821): 3-17), and so he abandoned his project. His Christian work in the field of Onto-epistemology retains some of the emphases of his earlier atheistic writings, most especially of which is his subscription to certain fundamental Augustinian ontological and epistemological concepts.

You may download the transcribed document here: Sketches of Subjectivity (Edited by Jonathan Cullings).

The Necessary Foundational Primacy of the Law of Identity

Professor Jacques Futon

Professor Jacques Futon standing outside of the Ecolé de Nouvelle Penseé, ca. 1842.

Concerning the Larger Documents

Dr. Jacques Futon left behind a number of somewhat larger documents, including unsubmitted scholarly journals, several monographs, and some book reviews.

The Necessary Foundational Primacy of the Law of Identity first appeared in Parva Litterarum. The editor of this site will soon have the original document scanned and available for download. Currently, the transcribed PDF can be downloaded here: The Necessary Foundational Primacy of the Law of Identity

[ed: Jonathan Cullings, Professor of Systematic Hermeneusis, BU]